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BRITAIN AND THE FRENCH RESISTANCE 1940-1942:
A FALSE START
by Laurie West Van Hook
M.A., University of Richmond, 1997
Dr. John D. Treadway

During the Second World War, the relationship between Great Britain and
the French Resistance endured endless problems. From the early days of the war,
both sides misunderstood the other and created a stormy relationship, which
would never mature later in the war. The French Resistance, initially small and
generally fractured, frequently focused on postwar political maneuvering rather
than wartime military tactics. Unification was sporadic and tenuous. Charles de
Gaulle offered himself as the leader of the Resistance but lacked experience. This
thesis also shows, however, that the British clung to the London-based de Gaulle
hastily in the early days of the war but quickly decreased their support of him.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was de Gaulle's most ardent supporter,
disp1ayed ambivalence and frustration with the general. Fellow resisters and the
British understandably viewed de Gaulle as a symbol more than a serious leader.
This natural link between the British and French Resistance failed to develop into
a mature relationship and precluded the chance for fuller strategic cooperation in
major Allied invasions of French territory in November 1942 and June 1944.
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INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War, the French Resistance failed to unify or
work effectively with Charles de Gaulle, the movement's symbolic leader. The
Resistance maintained a troublesome relations with Great Britain. Neither side
overcame a series of conflicts, battling egos, and internal confusion.

As a result,

Britain and the Resistance never developed a mature relationship that could aid
the Allied invasions of French North Africa in November 1942
Normandy in June 1944

(Torch) and

(Overlord). The British lacked a unified policy toward the

French Resistance. Acting out of a sense of desperation and isolation, the British
clung to de Gaulle in the early days after the German Blitzkrieg but later came to
question their support. Building up de Gaulle while keeping other options open,
the British pursued conflicting goals, confusing not only policy toward de Gaulle
and the Resistance but also fostering internal disagreements within the offices of
the prime minister and foreign secretary.
Over the past fifty years, glorification of the Resistance developed into a
popular myth about the courageous French citizens who risked everything in order
to regain their sovereignty. The term "Resistance" enhanced this myth because it
projected an oversimplification of the nature of the phenomenon and implied a
unified movement. It is a term of wide definition, referring to many groups and
methods of resistance. Noble or opportunitistic motivations, size, political or
1

3
Wartime conditions posed constraints on documenting clandestine activities.
Resisters maintained tight security and seldom wrote down instructions, missions,
and contacts. Underground movements avoided publicity.2 A resister only knew
the true identity of his or her immediate superior. Fear of the Gestapo,
infiltrators, and exposure overshadowed every detail of daily life.
Continuing intra-French divisions and the reluctance of postwar French
governments to release material on the Resistance has restricted use of primary
sources. Personal accounts are valuable in examining the innermost workings of a
network or problems facing the entire movement but reflect glorifications and
animosities.3 The memoirs of Charles de Gaulle (The Complete War Memoirs of

Charles de Gaulle, Vols. 1-3) and Anthony Eden (The Memoirs of Anthony Eden,
Earl of Avon: The Reckoning) exemplify how each author's inevitable subjectivity
and hindsight must be read cautiously. Historian Gordon Wright wrote about the
lack of balance in some historical studies. "Continental scholars, for example, are
inclined to give central attention to the various anti-Nazi resistance movements,

See, for example, Foreign Office note, 15 May 1944, Public Record Office,
FO 371, 318/41924. Hereinafter PRO.
2

See, for example, Andre Heintz, interview, Remembering D-Day: Fifty Years
Later, C-SPAN, 7 May 1994. Hereinafter Heintz, interview. Heintz represents a
3

decreasing number of resisters still living who can add to the oral history of the
Resistance. C-SPAN heavily utilized this interview for the Resistance perspective for
its Normany commemoration. Its use here illustrates both the positive and negative
aspects of oral history and hindsight.

4
either within Germany or in the occupied countries; while most Anglo-American
historians have dealt with the underground in rather offhand fashion."4
The most valuable primary sources for this thesis have been British
documents released in the 1990s supplementing those released in the 1970s, which
was the last time a thorough analysis of Britain's relations with the Resistance
could be undertaken. These documents show that a conflict within Britain
paralleled one within the Resistance.
Avoiding glorification without minimizing personal sacrifices presents the
challenge when examining the problems surrounding Britain and the Resistance.
Chapter one examines the rise of the Metropolitan, or continental, Resistance,
Charles de Gaulle's relationship with the Metropolitan Resistance, and the
fractured state of the Resistance, by the time the Allies had prepared to launch a
major military invasion. Chapter two analyzes the circumstances surrounding de
Gaulle's arrival on the international political scene. British actions during the fast
paced, crisis-ridden days surrounding the fall of France created confusion toward
de Gaulle and mounting frustration with his irritable nature. British and
Resistance operatives competed for military and intelligence operations in
Metropolitan France.

Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War: 1939-1945 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1968), 336.
4

5

The events and perceptions that arose in the early part of the war led to
the exclusion of de Gaulle in the active planning and execution of important
military invasions of French territory later in the war. Power struggles and a lack
of cohesion typified intra-Resistance behavior. Resistance leaders still spoke of
individualism on the eve of the Normandy invasion.5 One British Foreign Officer
recorded a dinner conversation with two Resistance leaders. "Each Resistant had
to make an individual choice, to examine his conscience and accept the technical
position of a rebel" before fraternity of all resisters could emerge. 6 Resisters
refused to concentrate on the immediate military objective of liberating France
and prematurely focused on their political position in the administration of
postwar France. Wartime conditions, inexperience, personal vendettas, and
political competitions precluded both a unified and effective Resistance and a
cohesive and consistent British policy toward the Resistance.

5

J. M. Baegner of the French Embassy in Angorra, which joined the Free
French, first objected to the Free French movement because it sought to unify all
French people, which countered French individualism and every person's right to
decide on the type of country France should be after the war. Translated from
Baegner memo, 9 July 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28213. See also Sir M. Lampson,
Cairo, memo, 11 Feb. 1941, PRO, FO 371, 2870/114/17.
6

Rooker's notes on dinner with Frenay and Bertain of Combat, 31 May 1944,
PRO, FO 371, 82/41906.

CHAPTER ONE
THE UNKNOWN WARRIORS

The German Blitzkrieg in the West began on 10 May 1940. Within a
matter of weeks, much of western Europe capitulated to Hitler.Over the next five
years the French Resistance struggled to emerge. Resister Pierre Guiilan de
Benouville stated, ''This is no war of chieftains or of princes, of dynasties or
national ambition; it is a war of peoples and causes. There are vast numbers ...
whose names will never be known, whose deeds will never be rewarded. This is a
War of the Unknown Warriors. 1 These unknown warriors came from diverse
social and economic backgrounds, resisted at different times and in different ways,
held varying objectives, and formed hundreds of small resistance networks.
Neither a centralized power structure nor a uniform alliance existed with Charles
de Gaulle or the British, which undermined the role of resisters in military
operations. One popular myth that, from the beginning, nearly every French
citizen sought to resist both Germany and Vichy France is false. In September
1941, the British Foreign Office estimated that only 100,000 people in France
rejected Vichy's policy of collaboration and supported the Resistance.2 The
Pierre Guillan de Benouville, The Unknown Warriors: A Personal Account
of the French Resistance, trans. Lawrence G. Blochman (New York: Simon &
1

Schuster, 1949), 8.

W. H.B. Mack note, 4 September 1941, PRO, FO 371, 11/28214.

2
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movement contained some noble, selfless citizens and many eleventh-hour patriots
and opportunists.
Reactions to the Franco-German armistice of 22 June 1940 and the
Resistance evolved from a mindset that developed after the First World War.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill commented, "France had conducted and carried
the main weight of the terrible land fighting from 1914 to 1918."3 This mentality
relied on falsehoods, ignorance, and strategic errors. French defensive military
doctrine centered around archaic trench warfare, a mode of fighting that ended
with the First World War. The Maginot Line, a defensive barrier constructed after
the First World War between France and Germany, ended before France's
northern border. There the French relied on protection from either the thick
Ardennes Forest or her Belgian neighbor, whose neutrality had been guaranteed
in a 1839 treaty, even though this route was the traditional path of enemy
invasion. French awareness of German offensive rearmament and modem
mechanization failed to respond with sufficient material and organization.
Although initially trampled by the Germans in the first part of the Great War, the
French eventually emerged victorious with Marshal Petain, the Victor of Verdun,
christened a national hero. The French believed a defensive strategy
complemented their notion that they would prove triumphant in future wars.

Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, vol. 2 of
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 35.
3

'Ihe Second World War

8
France also maintained a weak offensive political doctrine and supported the
Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, which were unstable
democracies in the 1920s and authoritarian regimes in the 1930s.
Additionally, interwar French governments failed to inspire the population
and faced considerable opposition in the 1930s. Twenty ministries rose and fell in
the years between 1932 and 1940. The Popular Front, a coalition government of
Left and Center parties from 1936 to 1938, represented for many the last hope for
a revitalized France. Its failure climaxed popular weariness of leaders who lacked
direction and succumbed to corruption. Leon Blum, former leader of the Popular
Front, believed fear of rightist groups, government soldiers, German troops, and
the loss of jobs and privileges caused the decline of the Third Republic.4
Rebuilding after the Great War had been a heavy burden, and the nation was
unable to cope with the modem preparation required for another war. Edouard
Bonnefous stated, "Morally, the nation was not ready, on the morrow of a long
and hard conflict, to sacrifice its hopes for a higher standard of living in order to
prepare for a new war which many did not believe to be in the offing."5

Milton Dank, The French Against the French: Collaboration and Resistance
(New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1974), 32. Blum later encouraged socialists, who
feared de Gaulle's reactionary nature, to rally to the general. New York to
Foreign Office, 18 December 1941, PRO, FO 371, Z10717/10376/17.
4

5

Edouard Bonnefous, "Political and Military Responsibilities for the Defeat
of 1940," The Fall of France, 1940: Caw;es and Responsibilities, ed. and intro.
Samuel M. Osgood (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972), 133.

9

The lightening war of 1940 enhanced an unstable political situation and left
the French people without a sense of direction. Historian M. R. D. Foot described
the French quandary:
Was it best to accept the fact of German domination
and collaborate, or to follow the aged marshal in an
attempt at an independent policy, or to resist? If to
resist, with what object-to restore the third republic,
or one of the monarchies; or to build a new kind of
France, and if so with marxist or Christian or agnostic
inspiration? And under American or British or
Russian or purely French sponsorship? And under
which French military leader? 6
The final downfall of the moderate government of Paul Reynaud began on
10 June 1940, when the government departed from Paris and relocated further
west and finally settled in Bordeaux. With a pacifist attitude securely embedded in
the French majority, the scene was set for a leader who could symbolize the
nostalgia, stability, honor, and enduring peace France had desired for so long.
Charles de Gaulle obsetved, "Just as a besieged fortress is near surrender as soon
as the governor talks of one, so France was heading for an armistice because the
head of her government officially contemplated one. "7 The people looked to
Petain as the only viable alternative. His past glories validated his view of patriotic
M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British
Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-1944 (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1966), 133.
6

Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle,
Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1964), 70.
7

10
action. Petain favored a negotiated peace to save an independant government for
even part of France.
The armistice divided the country into two geographic zones. The "Zone
Occupee" or Occupied Zone comprised the northern and western coastal areas.
The "Zone Libre" or Unoccupied Zone comprised the southern area. In the latter,
Petain established the Etat Fran9ais at Vichy and an Armistice Army. Many
resisters and non-resisters understood Petain's reasoning for peace. Resister
Philippe de Vomecourt expressed a common ambivalence:
However shameful some of us considered the
armistice, we could not deny that the terms seemed
curiously mild and almost sympathetic in their regard
for French feelings. If it were possible to judge it
purely from a military standpoint, it was not
dishonorable. The Germans did not demand the
surrender of the French fleet, only its demobilization.
They allowed sovereign rights to a French government
in the free zone, and even to the retention of an army
of 100,000 men on the soil of Metropolitan France.
Furthermore, the armistice left the empire intact. 8
The apparent invincibility of the Germans as a military force procured the French
population's easy acceptance of the armistice. In 1938, Hitler annexed parts of
eastern Europe. In 1939, Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the
Soviet Union, which divided Poland. The following year, the Wehrmacht blitzed

Philippe de Vomecourt, An Army
Doubleday, 1961), 54.
8

ofAmateurs (Garden City, NY:

11
through western Europe. The Battle of Britain represented the next step toward
the creation of a German New Order in Europe.
The French of both the occupied and unoccupied zones felt impotent
before the invincible Nazi war machine. In the words of resister Henri Michel,
"Since the nation in arms had failed to dam the Nazi flood, how could the
disarmed civilian population sweep the waters away, or indeed prevent them from
spreading further? And how much more impossible still to reverse the flow!"9
Hitler's leniency in the agreement coupled with his desire to eliminate Great
Britain temporarily benefitted the Vichy government. Many French thought Petain
was the savior of French sovereignty and responsible for a lenient armistice. The
real reason, of course, was that Hitler wanted to tum his attention to mounting a
surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the armistice divided French
geography and opinion. Propaganda promoted faith in the Marshal who as head
of the Etat Fran�ais had his people's best interests at heart. With "Travail,
Famille, Patrie" replacing the 1789 motto of "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite," the path
of peace and cooperation meant the average French citizen could focus on the
more immediate concerns of job security and supporting a family.
Marshal Petain's infamous meeting with Hitler at Montoire in October
1940 produced mixed results for both Vichy and the Resistance. The meeting

Henri Michel, "The Psychology of the French Resister,"
5, no. 3 (1970): 165.

9

History

Contemporary

12
defined a portion of France as part of the Nazi war effort. Pro- and anti-Vichyists
assigned great symbolic importance to the Petain-Hitler handshake. Reactions
covered both extremes. Henri Michel commented:
[some] sympathized with fascism, to whom that
prospect was welcome; others were simply lured by the
manna which the occupiers distributed; and lastly,
there were some who were inspired by nobler motives,
who went over to the victors not from sympathy, but
from pacifism-to put an end to the horrible and
catastrophic Franco-German hectacombs. 10
Many military officers became devoted supporters of Vichy and Petain's national
revolution. For Michel, it was a program based "upon the ideology of traditional
French reaction with a few fascist trimmings."11 Resisters and some non-resisters
viewed it as the ultimate defeat, with their image of the old Marshal destroyed.
To others, Petain's refusal to involve France in the war against England
encouraged a double game theory. Petain, though outwardly cooperating with
Hitler, was waiting for the right moment to reassert French sovereignty and end
submission to Hitler, perhaps even in conjunction with the Resistance. This
allowed for a certain continuity with the interwar mentality. Some citizens
preferred to excuse Petain and instead blame his colleagues for the armistice, such
as Vice-Premier Pierre Laval, whom many disliked and distrusted.

10I
11l

bid.

bid., 163.

13
Turning away from Vichy, however, did not necessarily mean increased
support for the Resistance or a more unified direction among resisters. Many
resisters, who had been anti-German yet pro-Vichy, realized only slowly that
Petain would not tum against Hitler. Henri Frenay, who later became the leader
of a large Resistance network, was one of those people: "Despite growing and
indisputable proofs, I felt a sort of repugnance to admit to myself that the old
Marshal, whatever his intentions, was actually serving the enemy." 12 Years later
Petain stated that people on both sides misrepresented his reasons for meeting
Hitler at Montoire. Petain intended to compare himself with Tsar Alexander I
who, Petain believed, had over a century before pretended to accept Napoleon's
friendship while conspiring against him. Petain sought to keep the Germans out of
Spain, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. He followed the lead of
Generalissimo Francisco Franco, whom Hitler visited prior to Montoire.13 Franco
reluctantly bargained with Hitler and avoided active participation in the war.
Just as a Vichy spirit existed before the creation of the regime, a
Resistance spirit preceded its development but with greater difficulty. Former
resister Henri Michel's psychological prerequisite for resistance was non-existent
among the majority of the French population:
Frenay, The Night Will End, trans. Dan Hofstadter (Great Britain:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), 97.
12Henri
13Sisley

1951), 81.

Huddleston, Petain: Patriot or Traitor? (London: Andrew Dakers,

14
In any army the combatants need to be given reasons
for fighting, although they have not been consulted
before being involved in it; and it is even more
necessary to enlist public opinion, without whose
support the combatants would become as weak as
Antaeus when his feet were off the ground. 14
Many resisters regarded the Etat Fran�ais as an occupying force similar to the
Germans in the Zone Occupee. Unlike their partisan counterparts in the Soviet
Union but similar to those in Yugoslavia, French resisters had no government
providing military, political, or moral support. Never fully occupied, the Soviet
Union and Stalin exercised some organization and control over partisans. With
past leaders a disappointment or part of Vichy, no well-known leaders emerged to
direct a resistance. Self-appointed network chiefs, supported by a few friends and
followers, struggled to assert their credibility and influence beyond network
borders.
Free French official Andre Pleven wrote to the British Foreign Office that
although a majority of people desired an Allied victory, only 10 to 15 percent of
the population were ready to risk their lives for the cause. 15 Although this figure
represented a few million people, they remained scattered and unorganized in an

14 Michel,

"Psychology," 159.

from Andre Pleven to Major Desmond Morton, 11 Feb. 1942,
PRO, FO 371, 699/32033. Pleven believed that number also represented true
Gaullists. Morton thought Pleven's projections were too speculative regarding the
support of the Free French in France. Morton to Mack, 13 Feb. 1942, PRO, FO
371, 699/32033. See also Spears note, 18 Feb. 1942, PRO, FO 371, 699/32033.
15Translated

15
occupied country. The number of people involved in the Resistance constrained
its ability to recruit and to act. Philippe de Vomecourt, one of the few actively
involved in clandestine activities, described the need for considerable caution.
"Ultimately an underground movement is sustained by trust, not suspicion. A
traitor lives by gaining the trust of those he intends to sell." 16
This constant strain among those trying to work together under already
difficult circumstances affected intra-Resistance relations and performance.
Relative inexperience and isolation meant most resistance groups arose
spontaneously. A few friends gathered to talk about the war and how they could
impede the Germans. Often newspapers appeared as the first sign of a new
network, making writers and journalists prime recruits. The dissolution of many
societal barriers, such as political parties, trade unions, and cultural associations,
by Vichy and the Germans benefitted the Resistance's development. New forms of
cooperation between those of diverse social strata emerged. In both zones,
resisters emerged from all walks of life, including aristocrats, professionals,
industrial workers, and merchants. According to Michel, early resisters also
possessed vivid memories of the First World War and a hatred of Germans.17
Members of the intelligentsia were among the first, albeit unarmed,
resisters. Writers conveyed a spirit of resistance and provided a starting point for

16

Vomecourt,Anny, 85.

17

Michel, "Psychology," 166-67.

16
motivating other resisters who preferred military action. Historian James
Wilkinson found the intelligentsia a consistent source of rebeJlion: "The ideals to
which the Resistance intellectuals rallied were traditional ones: freedom of
expression, freedom of conscience, the defense of human dignity, aU as set forth
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789." 18
Although collaborationist literature existed in France, such as Jacques
Benoit-Mechin's La Moisson de quarante, it was the authors in opposition to the
Germans and Vichy who came to dominate the literary scene. Jean-Paul Sartre
wrote several works, including Bariona ou le fils du tonnerre and Les Mouches,
which described his disgust with the prevalent mood of guilt and uncertainty
among the population and its refusal to react to the contemporary situation.
Sartre later joined with Albert Camus, Paul Eluard, and Edith Thomas in the
formation of Socialisme et Liberte, a literary Resistance group. Les Editions de
Minuit, the most important clandestine publisher, produced Agnes Humbert's
Notre Guerre, a diary of her days with the early Resistance group Musee de

l'Homme, and several short stories by Jean Bruller, a.k.a. Vercors. Bruller's La
Silence de la Mer is the story of an uncle and his niece forced to host temporarily

a German officer in stubborn silence.19
James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981), 45-46.
18

19

In describing his relationship with the German officer, the old man said,
"We never gave, nor did he take, anything remotely like an opening for

17
Men and women joined the Resistance to participate in the salvation of
France. The most expedient way to liberate France required the networks to put
aside differences since each represented only a fraction of the population.
Resisters, however, lost sight of the immediate goal of liberation and allowed their
political aims to take precedence. Diverse ideological objectives and
methodologies altered basic military strategies. Conflicts arising within one zone
added to differences between the Zone Occupee and the Zone Libre.
In the initial stages of development, resistance networks in the Zone
Occupee received more support than those in the Zone Llbre. The incessant
reminder of the Nazi troops and the restrictions these aliens imposed on every
day French life fostered germanophobia. Daily German military parades from the
Arc de Triomphe down the Champs-Elysees humiliated Parisians. Direct German
domination provoked acts of sabotage. Some resisters tore down German
propaganda posters placed jn Metro stations and on the streets while others
denied recognition of the foreigners. Agnes Humbert proudly witnessed a
Frenchman refuse a German soldier's offer of cigarettes.20 The predominance of
German forces in the Zone Occupee meant a higher risk and a greater difficulty
in the formation and maintenance of networks. Resisters quickly learned the
familiarity." Vercors, The
Macmillan, 1944), 11.
Agnes Humbert,

20

20, 27.

Silence of the Sea, trans. Cyril Connolly (New York:
Notre Guerre (Paris: Editions Emile-Paul Freres, 1946),

18
fundamental rules of underground activity, such as never write down incriminating
evidence, remain calm in any crisis, and respect instincts. Resistance operatives
learned to be conscious of every move made and word spoken. Still, innate
behavioral habits sometimes gave people away. Peter Leslie described one
incident.
A woman agent parachuted into France and was
caught by an alert Gestapo officer in Paris after he
had noticed her involuntarily looking to the right
before crossing a busy street-instead of to the left like
everyone else. The officer recalled that traffic in
Britain kept to the left of the road, and deduced that
anybody automatically checking on vehicles coming
from that direction must be English.21
Boris Vilde led the "Musee de l'Homme", one of the first groups in the
Zone Occupee. Created in Paris in July 1940, many of its members worked at the
Musee de l'Homme in the Chaillot Palace opposite the Eiffel Tower. Vilde built
an extensive network of contacts in a short period of time. His comrades helped
escaped French and Allied prisoners safely across the demarcation line to the
Zone Libre and eventually out of the country. On 15 December 1940, the group
published its first issue of the newspaper Resistance, which instructed the people
of France in the preparation and methods of insurrection. A double agent ended
Musee de !'Homme in early 1941, but the group inspired other networks. One

The Liberation of the Riviera: The Resistance to the Nazis in
the South of France and the Story of its Heroic Leader, Ange-Marie Miniconi (New
21

Peter Leslie,

York: Wyndham Press, 1980), 15-16.

19
evening immediately prior to his arrest, Vilde showed up on the doorstep of
Agnes Humbert knowing the risk he took returning to Paris. In response to
Agnes's words of concern, he replied, "Ma chere, nous irons tons en prison, vous
le savez."22
The Germans eventually occupied the Zone Libre in November 1942, in
Operation Attila, after the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa,
codenamed Operation Torch. Even then, however, fewer German soldiers
occupied the Zone Libre than the Zone Occupee, allowing southern networks to
develop more easily. After examining daily life and the relative ease of movement
in the south, a visiting Resistance leader from the Zone Occupee commented,
''The Resistance leaders go about openly, meet in cafes and busy restaurants, not
making the slightest effort to hide. They all but have calling cards bearing their
underground titles."23 The disaffected and rebellious members of the middle and
upper class elites led the Resistance even though the working class constituted
much of the core of the networks.
Resistance groups created in the Zone Libre promoted political aspirations
foremost. They wanted to expel the Germans, rid the country of the foul Etat
Fran�ais, and look to the establishment of a new progressive France. North and
22

Humbert, Notre Guerre, 65.

John F. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History
of the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1976), citing Pineau, La Simple Verite, 21.
23

20

south often conflicted. In contrast to the north, the south's political goals
overshadowed paramilitai:y operations, which were kept to a minimum until the
arrival of the Allied armies. The prevailing Petainist attitude of the populace
restrained violent resistance. If potential agitators kept quiet, reprisals could be
avoided. Therefore, resources first had to be directed toward persuasion and
unification of French attitudes in favor of the Resistance. Oandestine newspapers
were of the utmost importance in the Zone Libre. In the words of one resister,
the "press was the only thing which gave to an individual in one part of the
counti:y the feeling that he was a part of a national organization, (a fact) which
was capital from the standpoint of morale."24
De Benouville related another difficulty he faced in the eyes of French
collaborators. He held a post in the Vichy regime, a cover many resisters found
useful25 but awkward:
The treason of some of these old-time nationalists,
although it was just beginning, increased the risk of
capture for true patriots. Our former comrades were
not only bitter about our refusal to bow to defeat.
They were resentful of the old internal political
quarrels which had caused some of us to resign from
the Action Fran�se before the war, and which
neither the heat of the conflict nor its tragic outcome

24-femoinage of Bourdet, in Sweets, Politics of Resistance, 43.
For example, 11Noyautage de I'Administration Publique" consisted of
senior civil seivants positioned in the central and local governments.
25

21
could make them forget. They were out to attack us
with ever-increasing fury.26
Resisters in the Zone Llbre had to fight their fellow countrymen, more so than
those in the Zone Occupee, as well as the Germans. A resister had to feel a
strong belief in his or her convictions, especially at the hands of fellow Frenchmen
such as the Vichy police.
Marie-Madeline Fourcade, the only woman to head a major Resistance
network, began "Alliance" in 1940 in the Zone Llbre. The espionage-oriented
Alliance first supplied the British with locations of German military installations
and troop movements. Fourcade's network later supplied the Allies with a
detailed map of the Normandy coast used in the 1944 invasion and information
about German research in Brittany on the secret V-1 weapons. By the end of the
Second World War, Alliance's 3,000 members branched out all over France.
Fourcade maintained contacts in Spain, Monaco, England, and Belgium. Alliance
fascinated the Germans who nicknamed the organization Noah's Ark because
members had code names of animals. Fourcade was "Hedgehog".n
"Combat", "Liberation", and "Franc-Tireur" were the three most important
groups to emerge in the Zone Llbre, and their leaders played a significant part in
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the unification of the Resistance. They also exemplified important characteristics
of the Resistance movement as a whole, including the participation of diverse
social groups, the crossing of established social barriers, and the damaging
political struggles. Henri Frenay, a former career officer, created Combat, the
most organized and heterogenous of all the early Resistance networks. He drew
recruits from the disaffected military, Christian Democrats, intellectuals, workers,
Communists, and former members of the royalist and fascist aligned Action
Fran�aise, including Pierre Guillan de Benouville. Combat published a clandestine
newspaper, Verites. Leftist intellectual-journalist Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie
led Liberation and published a socialist newspaper, Le Populaire. Liberation
maintained ties with the political parties and trade unions Confederation Generale
du Travail, Confederation Fran�aise de Travailleurs Chretiens, and Comite
d'Action Socialiste. Franc-Tireur was the most radical and politically experienced
network. Led by Jean-Pierre Levy, a Jewish technician, the group spoke out for
democratic and republican principles in its newspaper, Le Franc-Tireur.28
Resistance leaders may have understood the need to unite against the
common enemy of Germany and Vichy, but distinctions protracted or prevented
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consolidation. Leaders refused to tone down their individual rhetoric. Continued
publication of numerous ideologically diverse newspapers increased competition
between the networks and impeded the process of unification. De Benouville
discussed how the lack of a centralized command caused operational problems
with rank-and-file resisters who overlapped one another on the same mission:
I had great difficulty making our men understand the
first principles of intelligence: that no agent should
transmit the same information to two different
organizations feeding the same point.... [S]light
differences in the text of the two versions would give
the central intelligence point the idea that the two
messages confirmed each other, whereas they were
ac tually only duplications. Our men, however, were
over eager, and once they had stumbled on a piece of
information they were in a hurry to pass it on.29
This typified the French Resistance's natural inexperience, poor internal
communication, and inability to keep resisters from joining more than one
network. Debates over methodology and the role of active operations
accompanied differences over ideology. De Benouville emphasized the difficulties:
"So, while some crews were busy putting out newspapers, others broke the store
30
windows of collaborationists.11

The ambiguous position of the French Communists in the early years of
the war confused the Resistance movement. Changes in French Communist
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behavior between 1939 and 1941 grew out of fluctuations in official Soviet policy.
The marginal position of the Communists in the Popular Front government of the
late 1930s changed with an agreement between the French and Soviet
governments against the common threat of Hitler. The Communists joined the
Socialists and Radicals without formally entering the government. Henri Michel
described the change in attitude:
[T]hey spoke with a completely new voice; they
demanded a firm attitude toward Hitler, called for
armed intervention on behalf of Republican Spain,
repudiated the Munich agreements, and favored the
broadest possible national unity and an "outstretched
hand to the Catholics.11 Like the socialists, they had
discovered in their turn that they possessed a
fatherland.31
Soon, however, diplomacy changed Communist rhetoric and split the party
with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. French Communists had
to follow the Soviet strategy of preserving a Communist peace and denouncing the
war as a conflict between rival imperialist powers. A clandestine press produced
propaganda opposing the war and Petain's regime, organizing defense groups, and
denouncing de Gaulle and his followers in London as "dangerous warmongers in
the pay of England."32 According to Michel, the Communists unsuccessfully
attempted to justify this sudden change:
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[The] USSR being the fatherland of the workers of all
the world, its defense was both the duty and the
interest of the workers of every country.... We can
be sure that none of them enjoyed making this
reversal of policy; many of them left the party, while
those who had been mobilized loyally performed their
duty.And those who remained faithful to the party
were, at the very least, demoralized and confused.33
Those who disobeyed Stalin's orders frequently joined networks such as Levy's
Franc-Tireur.In some parts of France, the Communists controlled the Franc
Tireur military wing.In the "red belt" of factories around Paris, the Communists
organized strikes.34 Other French Communists and the Soviet government
disapproved of this breach in loyalty, and ostracized many of them permanently
from the party.
When Hitler broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 22 June 1941 with his
surprise attack on the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, another sharp tum in
the official Communist attitude occurred.Stalin immediately called for all-out
opposition to the Germans and to Vichy.De Benouville saw the Communists as
enthusiastic resisters who despite the embarassment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact "had become Men of the Resistance, and these sons of France were not sorry
to find themselves fighting beside their brothers for the cause they had not yet
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been able to serve."35 Despite Communist vacillation early in the war, many
Communist networks managed to put politics aside, at least on the surface, for the
duration of the war. Michel wrote how the Communists avoided intra-Resistance
struggles which did not directly concern them:
Being very anxious not to weaken French unity or to
diminish the national combativeness to the occupiers'
advantage, the Communists took great pains not to
alarm their partners. They avoided all references to
their revolutionary programme and postponed to the
end of the war any examination of the extensive
reforms that their Gaullist and socialist partners were
advocating.36
The Communists attracted large numbers of recruits, including non
communists, because they spoke out for unity and direct action. They invited the
Left and the Right to join the Front National, the most militant network. 37 The
emphasis on action, though a by-product of a political philosophy, appealed to
resisters who yearned to fight the oppressor. Their ability to mobilize rapidly
increased the Front National's strength and influence and would make it one of
the most powerful Resistance groups in France by 1943.
A network developed also within the Armistice Army. Although loyal to
Petain, the Conservation du material hid military material for future use.
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Conseivation du material maintained a clandestine fleet of military trucks
camouflaged as civilian transport vehicles, attempted to unify and control local
initiatives aimed at stockpiling weapons, and constructed crude armored scout
cars.38 Historian· Robert Paxton described the position of army resisters:
[T]he clandestine planners in the Armistice Army were
a small, dispersed group condemned to no share in
national glory, unless the metropolitan Armistice Army
itself were to play a major role in the liberation of
France. Instead, the metropolitan Armistice Army was
destined to be dissolved in November 1942. The
strategic planners within its general staff were planning
for situations which never arose.39
Many army resisters had ambitious plans, but their ambiguous position
restrained their activities. Influential senior officers helped determine Vichy policy
and opposed rash violations of the Armistice agreement. The need to keep anti
government activities secret made communicating with resisters outside the Army
difficult. Their loyalty to Petain precluded joining other networks or following
anti-Petain leaders. They successfully horded military caches, which remained
unknown until the Germans occupied the south in November 1942 and discovered
the caches. The pacificism with which the Vichy officials accepted the occupation
shocked the Army. Loyalty to Petain wavered. In an act of protest and resistance,
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the Armistice Army destroyed its own fleet in the Toulon Harbor to evade
German control.40
Torch and Attila produced important psychological consequences. The
former destroyed the myth of the unbeatable German war machine, and the latter
eroded the myth of Petain's alleged double game. With all of France under
German occupation, differing conditions for resistance in the Zone Occupee and
the Zone Libre decreased. Where a divided France aided the Germans in the first
half of the war, the two zones' common plight provided both a false glimmer of
hope to the Resistance and added tensions as more militant movements emerged
in the second half.
A gradual shift of post-armistice attitudes away from Petain paralleled an
increasing awareness of the failure of collaboration. Inept Nazi and Etat Fran�is
propaganda disclosed to the French populace their truly subordinate status in the
Third Reich's New Order. The Germans had not returned over one million
French prisoners of war interned in Germany since 1940. Under Nazi pressure,
Petain reappointed Pierre Laval to the Vichy government in April 1942. The
Marshal had dismissed Laval in December 1940, but now with Petain losing his
popular support, Laval was needed to help maintain order and power in the Zone
Libre. Marshal Petain's public endorsement of Laval, who was openly pro-German
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and, in effect, the true head of the Etat Fran�ais, lowered the prospects that
Petain would reassert French sovereignty against the Germans.
In February 1943, Laval instituted the Service du Travail Obligatoire, which
conscripted all men between the ages of twenty-two and forty-two to forced labor
in Germany. Stories describing the harsh conditions in the labor camps quickly
circulated in France. Many workers ignored the summons and retreated to the
countryside and forests where they formed the maquis.41 Small groups had existed
since the armistice, but the Service du Travail Obligatoire led to a massive influx
of maquisards. In the words of resister Gilbert Renault-Roulier, a.k.a. Remy,
''without the seed planted in French soil for more than two years by the blood of
this minority, many who took to the maquis would otherwise have meekly
accepted forced labor in Germany."42 For several months, the Germans regarded
maquisards as mere outlaws.43 When the Nazis realized the potential threat of the
maquis, they created the "Milice", a special French police organization to root out
maquisards. Rivaling the Gestapo in cruelty, Milice power expanded.
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Some maquis operated independently, while others affiliated with existing
Resistance networks. Small maquis numbered about twenty people. This made
movement more inconspicuous but fostered regional loyalties and a reluctance to
join other maquis. Larger groups, however, proved unwieldy and exposed
themselves to German attacks and infiltration. Philippe de Vomecourt described
the maquis as "symptomatic of France divided, yet vengeful."44
Maquisards believed that they represented the military branch of
clandestine activities and would join an Allied liberation of the countryside. They
quibbled about short- and long-term strategic objectives. Most non-communist
maquisards saw their role in the war as one of diversion. They opposed engaging
the enemy unless attacked or needed to carry out a mission. Non-communist
fighters preferred to focus on preparation for an Allied landing and the postwar
administration of France. Communist maquisards, many of whom drew inspiration
from Soviet partisans, 45 sought to attack German soldiers and Vichy officials
whenever possible. They mastered ambush, assassination, intrigue, and hit and run
raids but showed little regard for casualties or German reprisals upon the civilan
population. At liberation, the Communists wanted to be the only group that
De Vomecourt, Army, 127. The maquis and other armed resisters were
"hopelessly intermingled and overlap[ped] each other to a very great extent. It
[was] consequently very difficult to obtain any reasonable estimate as to the real
strength of the Maquis Proper." Appreciation of Strength, 26 Jan. 1944.
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consistently and actively fought the Germans, thereby discrediting non-communist
resisters.46 Like other Resistance networks, both sides of the maquis, despite their
emphasis on military action, proved susceptible to political ambitions. This would
reduce their effectiveness as a fighting force and decrease their support with the
local population and the British.
The Resistance also existed outside of Metropolitan France. Charles de
Gaulle created the Free French, later called la France Combattante or Fighting
France/French. 47 A few days before Reynaud's moderate government departed
Paris on 10 June, de Gaulle, recently promoted to general, became Reynaud's
Undersecretary of State for National Defense. Against the backdrop of the
German Blitzkrieg, de Gaulle rose as the Third Republic fell. He exemplified a
rare perseverance among government officials. He planned for the reemergence of
an independent France and alleviated a sense of national humiliation felt by the
surrender. 48
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[I]f the war of '40 is lost, we can win another. Without
giving up the fight on European soil as long as it is
possible, we must decide on and prepare for the
continuation of the struggle in the Empire.That
implies a policy to fit: the transport of resources to
North Africa, the choice of leaders qualified to direct
the operations, and the maintenance of close relations
with the British, whatever grievance we may have
against them.I propose to you [Paul Reynaud] that I
should deal with the measures to be taken for the
purpose. 49
De Gaulle's optimism and determination left those in control unaffected.
He found Petain's interpretation of the war as just another Franco-German
conflict short-sighted.The Marshal failed to grasp the ''world character of the
conflict, the possibilities of the overseas territories, and the ideological
consequences of Hitler's victory...." In short, Petain showed his age, and for
France, "[o]ld age is a shipwreck."50
General de Gaulle arrived in London at dawn on 16 June 1940.In
response to Petain's request for an armistice on 17 June, de Gaulle delivered his
appeal to the French people over the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, on
18 June:
The leaders who, for many years past, have been at
the head of the French armed forces, have set up a
government. ...But has the last word been said?
Must we abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and
irremediable? To those questions I answer-No! ... I,
4
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General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French
officers and men who are at present on British soil, or
may be in the future, with or without their arms; I call
on all engineers and skilled workmen from the
armaments factories who are at present on British soil,
or may be in the future, to get in touch with me.
Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance
must not and shall not die.51
For the few French citizens who heard de Gaulle's broadcast, 18 June emitted the
spark for the next five years of the war.Isolated volunteers reached England daily,
but only a few hundred had shown up by the end of the month to join General de
Gaulle.52 Resister Andre Heintz spoke of the difficulty of supporting the general
in France. "I was for de Gaulle, but he was in England.It was difficult to get
instructions; our only communication came from BBC broadcasts. 1153
Other resisters distrusted de Gaulle and his self-appointed status as the
movement's leader.De Gaulle garnered less popular support than many of the
networks emerging in France.54 Resisters thought de Gaulle incapable of
comprehending the continental situation because he was not there on a day-to-day
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basis. Bitterness haunted de Gaulle's attempts to unify those French who resented
his fleeing across the Channel. Some resisters found de Gaulle and his followers
too narrow-minded. Henri Frenay, Combat leader, said the general viewed any
refusal by network chiefs to subordinate their authority to him as a felony. De
Gaulle was unable to understand that the network leaders were a vital connection
between himself in London and the masses in France.55 Free French agents sent
over to France could not appreciate the work of Metropolitan resisters and
misinterpreted any network independence as treason. Historian Milton Dank
described the situation: "Too strongly Gaullist in their thinking and resented
because of their inability to supply money and arms in the quantities required,
they simply added to the squabbling."56
Distrust of Charles de Gaulle and the politicians in London reinforced
attitudes toward the Armistice and the Vichy puppet regime in many Frenchmen.
Though eventually accepted, at least symbolically, as the primary leader of the
Resistance struggle, many feared de Gaulle would establish a military dictatorship.
Some British diplomats believed that "all French opinion wants a dictatorship, but
a purely French one: they hoped for a man like de Gaulle of proved patriotism
who would root out the old corruption, class and party struggles, and would
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rebuild France on a new basis."57 De Benouville reflected upon his lasting opinion
of the French leaders in London:
I had serious reseivations regarding the French
politicians who were regrouping in London. It was
evident to one that the old political parties were
bankrupt. They had failed in preparing for the war,
they had failed at Munich, they had failed by
capitulating to the Germans, and they were failing
under the occupation. France, abandoned by those
who had given her such false and feeble leadership,
was finding her own way back to life and I viewed with
suspicion the activities of the refugee politicians in
London, who seemed ready to profit by the
resurrection in which they played no part, but which
might get them their old jobs back. Their actions
seemed motivated by a desire to cling to their former
status, rather than by any wish to restore liberty to
France and, with it, to all of Europe.58
De Benouville's skepticism typified that of many French citizens. At the
time of the Armistice, popular opinion reflected a belief that life could not
become any worse than it had been under past governments and the German
invasion. "The people who shouted 'Long live Petain!' were really shouting 'Long
live Life!' For they remembered the roads caked with refugees, the
bombardments, the days of exodus, and the nights of death."59
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De Gaulle also distrusted the Metropolitan Resistance and believed only
he was qualified to lead France. "Against the enemy, despite the Allies, regardless
of terrible dissensions, I would have to constitute around myself the unity of
lacerated France."60 Before the war, the general viewed French defensive military
doctrine and the Maginot Line as insufficient. The war proved him right. De
Gaulle predicted that the Communists would be ready to unleash anarchy at
liberation. Only a national liberation government under his guidance could stop
them. "Such was my task! To reinstate France as a belligerent, to prevent her
subversion, to restore a destiny that depended on herself alone."61 In a meeting
with Frenay and d'Astier, de Gaulle recalled, ''Their accounts emphasized the will
toward organization and the pressure from the rank-and-file toward unity, but also
the extreme individualism of the leaders, from which their rivalries resulted."62
The general was unwilling to credit the efforts of the Metropolitan leaders or
listen to their concerns. He sought instead to instigate his own unification with the
help of Jean Moulin, a.k.a. Max, who assumed primary responsibility for the
tremendous task of unifying the Resistance.
Moulin went to London after the Armistice to solicit support and funding
for some southern Resistance groups. Moulin returned to France in late 1941 as
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de Gaulle's delegate-general. He set out to coordinate and control support for a
unified Resistance in Metropolitan France. Moulin found and organized the most
dedicated resisters into cells of approximately seven men each. Upon an Allied
invasion, the cells would form a secret army. Though a good idea on paper, the
cells created problems. Each cell leader knew his immediate superior, but not his
neighbor. Dewavrin, a.k.a. Passy, an associate of de Gaulle's in London, opposed
the cell plan, calling it an example of de Gaulle's preference for propaganda over
militant operations.63 De Gaulle favored a policy of auentisme and showed a lack
of confidence in the Resistance's ability to carry out successfully independent
paramilitary actions.
Moulin, with the help of Yves Morandat, spent 1942 in France laying the
foundations for unification. Morandat's trade union experience complemented
Moulin's intellectual, administrative, and business knowledge. They organized
small acts of insurrection and built a framework for Resistance networks. Changes
in Vichy policy and Nazi actions had spawned a dramatic growth in the Resistance
and advanced Moulin's efforts. German repression and reprisals to Resistance
activity began in late 1941 after the Communists joined the Resistance effort.
Field Marshal Keitel's "Night and Fog" order of 7 December 1941 called for the
instant execution of any non-German civilians guilty of crimes against the Reich
or the occupying authorities. The Germans transported those accused to the Reich
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for punishment when it was impossible simply to impose a death sentence through
the courts. The term "Night and Fog" derived from the Gestapo's announcement
of names but never the fate of those arrested. Deportations, usually at night,
included many Jews.64 Historian M.R.D. Foot described its effect: "For every
Frenchman or Frenchwoman that reprisal executions of this kind frightened into
acquiescence, a score were shocked into opposition-in their hearts at least-and
so became ripe for recruiting."M
By the autumn of 1942, Moulin appeared ready to form a national
organization. De Gaulle established a military coordinating committee, comprised
of the "Armee Secrete" and "Groupes Francs", for southern France with Moulin as
its president. The Armee Secrete would remain unarmed until an Allied landing.
The Groupes Francs pursued immediate action directed toward embarassing but
not harming collaborators. For example, resisters warned customers before
blowing up a newsstand that sold collaborationist newspapers.66 The military
coordinating committee first met on 11 November 1942, following Operation

Torch.

De Gaulle appointed General Charles Delestraint as commander-in-chief.
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experienced Delestraint.67 Frenay's Combat forces made up a large part of this
new military group, and his power play foreshadowed future quarrels with
Delestraint.
The initial results of Moulin's efforts to unite the Resistance would not
occur until January 1943, after the Anglo-American invasion of French North
Africa. By then, it was too late for the Resistance to play an active role in the
campaign. The French Resistance would continue to display unstable
characteristics throughout the war. Internal problems and external tensions with
the British prevented a cohesive organization. An increased desire to unify
coincided with the belief, as Michel stated, that "a purely military victory, without
political significance, would be an incomplete victory."68 Resisters remained
skeptical of de Gaulle's ambitions and methods, even though he served a purpose
as a symbol of the Resistance and a regenerated France. De Gaulle would follow
another plan to increase his power by pursuing relations, though equally
contentious and tenuous, with the British.
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CHAPTER 1WO
FROM DAYS OF CONFUSION TO DAZE OF CONFUSION

On 28 June 1940, the British government recognized General Charles de
Gaulle as the leader of all Free Frenchmen who rallied to him and the Allied
cause. It was a desperate, superficial, largely vacuous act. The phrase "the year
alone" has been used frequently to describe Britain in 1940 and 1941, between the
fall of France and the entry of the United States into the Second World War.
London played host to numerous governments-in-exile. For France, the British
needed a symbol to counteract the myth of Petain and attract French citizens who
opposed German rule. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been a vocal
champion for France, believing the United States and Great Britain had
mistreated France after the Treaty of Versailles. In and out of power since July
1921, Churchill had consistently pressed for a treaty committing Britain to the
defense of France, culminating in the spring of 1939 in a close military alliance.
The British latched onto de Gaulle in the final days of the battle for
France because the general ardently favored continuing the fight. John Colville,
Churchill's Private Secretary, described the British need for de Gaulle:
Charles de Gaulle was no more a Churchillian than
Churchill was a Gaullist; but it may be said without
undue exaggeration that Churchill created de Gaulle,
though certainly not in his own image, and with still
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less fear of contradiction that had it not been for
Churchill, de Gaulle would in all
probability have been discarded at an early stage in
the war.1
The British thought they could control de Gaulle, a newcomer to the international
political scene, but de Gaulle proved them wrong. Desperation and calculation
produced confusion. Official British words and actions reflected short-term
concerns without thinking through long-term consequences. Combined with
ambiguous rhetoric, uncertainty of de Gaulle's place in the overall war effort, and
the general's irascible personality, a daze of confusion emerged and enveloped
British policy toward de Gaulle.
British War Cabinet minutes first mentioned de Gaulle on 9 June 1940.
Churchill made reference to a conversation with the general held that afternoon.
The new Undersecretary for National Defense gave the prime minister "a more
favorable impression of French morale and determination,"2 than the rest of the
old guard in the French government. When Churchill and Secretary of War
Anthony Eden traveled to Briare on 11 June for a meeting with Reynaud,
Churchill saw that only Reynaud and de Gaulle wanted to continue the fight
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against Germany.3 Eden wrote of the French government's reaction to Churchill's
statement that Britain would fight on, even if alone, "Reynaud was inscrutable and
[commander-in-chief General] Weygand polite, concealing with difficulty his
skepticism. [Vice-President of the Council] Marshal Petain was mockingly
incredulous. Though he said nothing, his attitude was obviously

C'est de la

blague."4
On 13 June, Churchill related to the War Cabinet another meeting he had
that day in Briare with Reynaud, who asked Churchill to release France from her
pledge not to seek a separate peace so that he could arrange for an armistice. The
two men agreed to appeal once more to President Franklin Roosevelt who had
not responded to Reynaud's previous appeal for help of 10 June. Later that day,
Churchill received a copy of Roosevelt's response to Reynaud's 10 June letter.
[T]his government is doing everything in its power to
make available to the Allied governments the material
they so urgently require, and our efforts to do still
more are being redoubled. This is so because of our
faith in and our support of the ideals for which the
Allies are fighting.... It is most important to
remember that the French and British fleets continue
mastery of the Atlantic and other oceans; also to
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remember that vital materials from the outside world
are necessary to maintain all armies.5
Churchill wrongly inferred American action in the near future. The
message "came as near as possible to a declaration of war and was probably as
much as the President could do without Congress. The President could hardly
urge the French to continue the struggle, and to undergo further torture, if he did
not intend to enter the war to support them."6 The War Cabinet concluded:
[A]lthough the implications of the message might be
clear to the Anglo-Saxon mind, they might appear in
rather a different light to the French, who would be
looking for something more definite. It would be
necessary to point out to them that the message
contained two points which were tantamount to a
declaration of war-first, a promise of all material aid,
which implied active assistance; and second, a call to
go on fighting even if the government was driven right
out of France.7
The French, however, better understood the ambiguities, implications, and
lack of commitment in the American response. Reynaud sought a firm declaration
5
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of war from Roosevelt. "[I]f you cannot give to France in the hours to come the
certainty that the United States will come into the war within a very short time,
the fate of the world will change.''8 This irony emerged on 15 June, when
Roosevelt told Churchill that his message in no way committed the United States
to military participation.9
Whether or not American military support would have altered Reynaud's
subsequent moves in light of the pressure on him to seek an armistice, the
American reply did influence British actions. French capitulation drew nearer,
leaving Britain alone to battle Germany. Churchill met with de Gaulle about a
proposed declaration of closer union between Britain and France. De Gaulle
asserted that dramatic support was essential for Reynaud to keep France in the
war. The declaration provided for a constitution that included a single War
Cabinet, joint citizenship, and joint defense, foreign, financial, and economic
policies.10 The plan backfired. The majority of the French Council reacted
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adversely to the proposed declaration. They expected instead a reply to the idea
of armistice terms. The Council found the British move arrogant, provincial, and
pompous. Petain refused to examine the declaration on the principle that it
relegated France to British Dominion status.11
That the British War Cabinet considered, yet alone drafted, this declaration
illustrated its desperation. Over the centuries, Britain and France had spent more
time as enemies rather than allies. To make such a leap of faith to complete
political integration and to expect France to submit its sovereignty to Britain but
not to Germany was peculiar, even under those dire circumstances. The War
Cabinet's reliance on de Gaulle's advice, a newcomer defending the minority
position of the French Council opinion, was unrealistic. The declaration
represented a desperate eleventh-hour move to keep France in the war more than
a viable foundation for a future. At the same time, however, the War Cabinet,
though under strain, recognized that "such a proclamation raised some very big
questions with which it was difficult to deal at such short notice."12 Future actions
raised those and more problematic questions within a matter of days. On 16 June,
Reynaud succumbed to mounting pressure within the French Council and
resigned. Marshal Petain, the Victor of Verdun, formed a new government and
established the Etat Fran�ais at Vichy.
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To avoid arrest and execution, on 17 June, de Gaulle flew to England with
Major-General Sir Edward Spears. Once de Gaulle arrived in England, the British
did not know how to handle him. On the one hand, he represented the remnants
of a French will to fight the Germans, but he was an unknown quantity. On 18
June, the War Cabinet agreed that de Gaulle should not broadcast on the BBC
because he was persona non grata in France. The Cabinet hoped the new Vichy
government would follow Allied interests. Later, however, after consulting each
other individually, the Cabinet reversed its initial decision. Concern over the fate
of French aircraft in Bordeaux and German propaganda against continuing the
fight led the Cabinet to believe the broadcast would provide a rallying point for
French pilots and citizens.13 Within the short span of one week, de Gaulle evolved
from a newly appointed undersecretary to a potential symbol of resistance.
An early change in de Gaulle's speeches illustrated his conversion. His
broadcast of 18 June called on the French to keep fighting and get in touch with
him. Twenty-four hours later, he spoke of his leadership role. "Faced by the
bewilderment of my countrymen, by the disintegration of a government in thrall to
the enemy, by the fact that the institutions of my country are incapable, at the
moment, of functioning, I, General de Gaulle, a French soldier and military
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leader, realize that I now speak for France." 14 The confusion, tension, and disaster
of that week, however, merely set the tone for more uncertainty the following
week and tenuous relations in the future. In plucking de Gaulle out of obscurity,
the British ignored his own transformation, ideas, and personality traits. They saw
him as a wind-up doll and thought they could program his words and actions.
British intelligence operative F. W. Deakin described the prevailing attitude
toward resistance movements: ''The idea of irregular warfare against a continental
enemy had never been in historical terms a theme of enquiry in official British
military quarters." 15 Other countries had used guerrilla warfare since the
Napoleonic Wars, and with the fall of France, Churchill considered. new methods
of military operations. On 23 June, the War Cabinet agreed in principle to
recognize a French National Committee headed by de Gaulle but postponed
16
official announcement until he proposed specific members.

With the armistice signed, the Cabinet worried about the fate of the
French fleet in the Mediterranean and whether it would fall into German hands.
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Time was of the essence to find a legitimate and credible focus for any
Frenchmen, including the fleet commanders, inclined toward the Allied cause.17
De Gaulle's broadcast of 23 June preached sedition, 18 which neither
complemented British efforts to encourage Frenchmen to fight Germans, not
other Frenchmen, nor ensured friendly control of the French fleet. The British
still maintained diplomatic relations with the Petain government and hoped to
avoid formal war with Vichy. Sir Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare,
wrote on 26 June 1940:
Another day of infuriating uncertainty. Still no
Frenchmen blowing any trumpets anywhere except de
Gaulle in London, and his trumpet blasts are
becoming a bit monotonous. The "National
Committee" is still only a name. There are rumors of
this and that notable Frenchman on his way to
England, or, in North Africa....Still no hard news
about the fleet.... These Frenchmen have all become
sawdust, or, if you prefer another metaphor, we see
before our eyes nothing less than the liquifi.cation of
France.19

Tbe War Cabinet disbelieved Reynaud's continued assurances that the
fleet would not go to the enemy.The former premier had broken his
government's treaty obligations to Britain and promises not to arrange for a
separate peace. From the British viewpoint, Reynaud now laid under the German
thumb with the rest of the former government. Ibid., 24 June 1940, 178(40).
17
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On 28 June, the British government prepared a statement for de Gaulle's
broadcast that evening. "His Majesty's Government recognize General de Gaulle
as the leader of all free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in
support of the Allied cause.'t20 The British pledged moral and material aid but
narrowly interpreted the statement. As Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden later
wrote that "recognition which H.M.G. have accorded to de Gaulle [was] strictly
limited."21 The general was the leader of all Frenchmen who rallied to him in
conjunction with Allied aims but not the leader of the government of France.
Colville wrote in his diary on 26 June 1940 that it was "never intended that
de Gaulle should be any more than a rallying point for expatriated Frenchmen."22
The opposite occurred. Just as the British over optimistically interpreted
Roosevelt's vague response to Reynaud's 10 June letter and wrongly anticipated
America's entry into the war, many Frenchmen now read more into the British
declaration than its authors had intended. De Gaulle thought his committee would
be dealt with on all matters pertaining to the war.23 Two days earlier he had sent
Churchill a memorandum outlining his plans for a committee regardless of the
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War Cabinet's formal and final decision.24 French journalists who distrusted de
Gaulle believed Major-General Spears created de Gaulle.25 Some American
diplomats viewed the announcement as recognizing de Gaulle's committee as the
only sovereign authority of France,26 while others held to the British view.27
Though the British anticipated that trouble would follow in the wake of the
announcement, they hoped to avoid its consequences. A Confidential Annex to
the War Cabinet Minutes of 24 June suggested that the British declaration had
gone too far. It implied severing relations with the new French government. "The
declaration had not, however, gone as far as this. But in any event those present
at the discussion had agreed that we could not draw back. The waverers would be
influenced only by strong action on our part. If we hesitated, they would give way
all along the line."28 Therefore, a formal agreement of the "organization,
employment, conditions of service and equipment of Free French Forces was
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drawn up between the prime minister and General de Gaulle, and ratified by an
exchange of letters on 7 August 1940."29
Not until the following year did a draft pamphlet describe formal British
policy toward de Gaulle as established on 27-28 June. De Gaulle's French
National Committee had jurisdiction over those Frenchmen on British territory
and administration and military direction over those in Britain. "H[is] M[ajesty's]
Government declare that they will recognize such a Provisional French National
Committee and will deal with them in all matters concerning the prosecution of
the war, so long as that Committee continues to represent all French elements
resolved to fight the common enemy."30 The words "so long as" precluded open
ended, unconditional support of de Gaulle in the collective mind of the War
Cabinet. The broadcast statement supported de Gaulle only as far as other
Frenchmen chose to follow him. It did not elevate de Gaulle as the leader of
France, but rather as a symbolic leader for those who supported him. A cover
note attached to the draft pamphlet illustrated the deterioration of relations with
de Gaulle. "The pamphlet shows the Free French movement in the best light, but
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it would be wrong to ignore its critics."31 The Foreign Office viewed de Gaulle as
a supporter of both the left wing and quasi-fascist sectors of French politics.32
Several incidents in the first few months of the war increased Anglo-Free
French tensions. On 3 July, the British acted on their concerns about the French
fleet in the Mediterranean with Operation Catapult. The British fleet sailed to
Mers-el-Kebir, a North African port where the French fleet awaited further orders
to disarm. The French Navy assumed the British fleet had come to fight the
Italian Navy for control of the Mediterranean. Instead, the British Navy told the
French to join the British ships in order to fight Germany, or sail under British
supervision to ports in England, the West Indies, or the United States to be
disarmed until the end of the war, or prepare for a battle with the British fleet.
Anglo-French negotiations and the ensuing battle destroyed the French fleet.

Catapult also took possession of French ships in British ports, such as Alexandria,
Egypt.33

Catapult proved detrimental to the Anglo-French relationship. Designed to
demonstrate British determination, the affair eliminated any chance of the French
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Navy joining the Allies.34 It increased not only anglophobia among the French
population and Vichy officials but also collaboration with the Germans. The
operation hindered de Gaulle's recruitment from London because of his
association with the British. De Gaulle believed that the French fleet would never
be used against the Allies. He was furious when he heard about the fait accompli,
especially as it caused several large French colonies not to rally to the Free
French.35
The joint Anglo-Free French naval expedition to Dakar, a West African
colony under Vichy control, proved equally disastrous. Before the attack began on
30 September, a security leak in de Gaulle's headquarters in England resulted in a
surprise meeting with Vichy ships positioned south of Gibraltar. Dakar's Governor
Boisson, who was pro-Vichy yet anti-German, feared a German occupation of
North Africa if he did not order the inhabitants to defend the colony. 36 When it
became clear only a major expedition could overtake the area, the British ended
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the operation. 37 Free French credibility decreased with the British, resisters,
potential resisters, and opponents. The British Foreign Office stated:
Vichy had been forewarned of the enterprise owing to
indiscretions, if not worse, at [de Gaulle's
headquarters], and that de Gaulle had been grossly
misinformed by his agents about the strength of his
following in French West Africa. These suspicions of
Free French reliability played their part in fomenting
later troubles. 38
British support of de Gaulle wavered. "His Majesty's Government will no doubt
continue, on the wireless and by other means, to dissociate themselves publicly
from any intention of endeavoring to influence Frenchmen as regards their future
form of government. "39
War secretary Eden, who became foreign secretary for a second time in
December 1940, disliked and distrusted the French and de Gaulle from the start.40
Eden had little use for any Frenchmen, let alone the peevish and difficult de
Foreign Office minute, 26 Sept. 1940, PRO, FO 371, C10384/65/l 7; War
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Gaulle, because France irreparably humiliated herself by quickly capitulating to
Germany. He seldom backed de Gaulle, preferring to leave Britain's options open
regarding policy toward France and Vichy. His motto was "cover all bases and
hedge all bets."41 Eden avoided direct contact with de Gaulle when the general
acted outrageously.
I expect that most of the Frenchmen you meet regard
de Gaulle as being in our pocket, and consider that
everything he says or does has our prior approval. If
you bad to deal with him for a week you would know
that this is far from being the truth!42
He arranged for all Free French communications to the Foreign Office to go
through French National Committee member Maurice Dejean, who served as de
Gaulle's spokesman on foreign policy.43
Even though Eden realized that Britain built up de Gaulle as a symbol of
resistance to Germans in France, be still saw an overall disadvantage in affiliating
with de Gaulle.44 "Unfortunately the main obstacle, which seems to be
insuperable, to harmonious relations within the movement and to harmonious
collaboration with ourselves is [de Gaulle's] personality and the domination of his
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mind by an extravagant conception of his mission."45

With the advantage of

hindsight to de Gaulle's later political accomplishments, Eden's memoirs softened
his opinion of the general.
I had the most sincere admiration for this great
Frenchman's qualities.To know him was to
understand how exaggerated was the picture, often
created of him in the public mind of arrogance and
even majesty....His selflessness made it possible for
him to keep the flame of France alive when in political
and more diplomatic hands it must have flickered out.
Yet de Gaulle was the victim of his qualities,
for the fetvor of his faith made him at times too
suspicious of the intentions of others....On the most
egoistic grounds of national advantage, it was to our
interest that France should be strong and that the
French empire should sutvive, if possible intact, but I
doubt if General de Gaulle ever believed this.46
Other officials found de Gaulle's headquarters chaotic, his behavior a
threat to Churchill's personal credibility, and his organization an embarrassment
to British dealings with the French people and Vichy.47 Foreign Office Permanent
Undersecretary Alexander Cadogan's initial impression was that de Gaulle had a
"head like a pineapple and hips like a woman."48 De Gaulle's enthusiasm and
45
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devotion failed to overcome his lack of political experience or eradicate the
impression he conveyed of an unnatural leader. Sir Samuel Hoare, British
ambassador in Madrid, said the de Gaulle movement "excites interest, but not
great confidence; de Gaulle is popular but considered unsuitable for the task of
leadership on account of his junior rank."49
W. H. B. Mack, head of the Foreign Office's French Department, agreed
that de Gaulle lacked an aptitude for the art of politics but disagreed that he
possessed popular appeal or charm.50 More experienced leaders initially joined
with Petain, such as Admiral J. F. Darlan, or refused to leave France, such as
jewish politician Georges Mandel, or left France and the fighting entirely, such as
former secretary general of the French Foreign Office Alexis Uger.51 John
Colville wrote:
There was no other available politician of comparable
renown and experience. The lot therefore fell on
Charles de Gaulle. He was a single-minded man with
one supreme obsession: the honor and glory of France.
4
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Scrupulously honest and unself-seeking where his
personal interests were concerned, he was devious and
offensive when he thought the interests of his country
were at stake. For him any means whatever justified
his only end, which was to restore the greatness of
France.52
The British government struggled to ascertain the extent of de Gaulle's
political ambitions. Originally, the Free French movement had a military focus but
as British distrust of de Gaulle grew, so too did his exclusion from military
matters.53 Major Sir Desmond Mor.ton of the Foreign Office suggested a political
focus for the Free French54 but that contradicted the British principle of letting
the French people choose their own leader. Just as de Gaulle's political skills had
been questioned, so to were his democratic tendencies when the movement lacked
a diversity of independent minds.55
Throughout the war, the British disliked much of what de Gaulle
broadcasted because of the potential implications of his words but failed to
recognize their own shortcomings and potential for disaster in their statements
and actions. The Ministry of Information, under Viscount Brendan Bracken,
52
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regularly crossed swords with de Gaulle. Unlike the other governments-in-exile,
the general frequently submitted copies of his proposed broadcast speeches long
after the Ministry's standard deadline for review.56 De Gaulle attacked Petain, a
tactic Bracken disliked because the Marshal was a sacred symbol to many French
citizens.
De Gaulle's independence sabotaged the British government's overall
propaganda plan. 57 Bracken spoke of de Gaulle's detrimental effect on the war
effort:
Propaganda should be presented as an indivisible
whole. Talks, news, and entertainment should be
carefully planned by one authority with a view both to
short- and long-term policy. Not only should the
propaganda to each foreign country be so planned but
coordination between the lines of propaganda to be
put out to the different countries must be ensured by
the responsibility of one authority. If this is generally
true of propaganda for all countries, it is still more
true for France where our line of policy is a delicate
one requiring the greatest care in presentation and in
the avoidance of pitfalls.58
Symbolism and reality conflicted in the delivery of rhetoric to the subjected
people of France. De Gaulle threatened not to broadcast if the Ministry of
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Information censored his speeches. Bracken recognized the value of de Gaulle's
voice over the ahwaves but feared that allowing de Gaulle to speak uncensored
undermined the whole propaganda policy.59
Churchill, the most ardent champion of France in the British government,
admired de Gaulle but neither particularly liked him nor forgave de Gaulle's
constant suspicions of British motives throughout the war.00 De Gaulle resented
both the lack of attention given to his Free French cause and the British
propensity for "professional decorum and habit to respect the normal order of
things-that is to say, Vichy and its missions."61 De Gaulle suspected that Britain
had selfish designs, which Britain disclaimed, on the French colonies, such as Syria
and Lebanon.62 The general privately protested the term "minor ally" 63 and
publicly protested treatment as one. "Over a period of 1,500 years, [France] has
become accustomed to being a great power, and insists that everybody, and first of
all her friends, should not lose sight of this fact."64
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Not surprisingly, Churchill questioned each step he took in support of de
Gaulle, in spite of his admiration for the general's spirit. John Colville explained:
"Almost the only obstacle to the surge of anti-French feeling in government circles
was Winston Churchill."65 When de Gaulle's behavior irritated Churchill, the
prime minister subtly pulled back British support. For example, when de Gaulle
gave an interview in August 1941 that included several anti-British statements,
Churchill told the governmental departments to "adopt a cautious and dilatory
attitude toward all requests made by the Free French."66
When Eden replaced Viscount Edward Halifax as Foreign Secretary,
Halifax became Ambassador to the United States. As American involvement in
the war evolved from benevolent neutrality toward the British cause to active
involvement by December 1941, Halifax served as a conduit between divergent
British and American views of the French Resistance and Vichy regime. Already
strained relations between Churchill and de Gaulle grew more tenuous as
American influence over the course of the war increased. British support of the
Resistance movement waned but did not disappear with the emergence of a
stronger ally. Halifax reported that, to the Americans, it would be a "fatal mistake
for the United States government to recognize any refugee group [de Gaulle] as a
65
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govemment."67 For the British, however, "tiresome though he is, General de
Gaulle possesses qualities which are not possessed by any other members of the
Free French movement or by any of the Frenchmen in London or the United
States who have hitherto held themselves aloof. Moreover, he symbolizes
resistance in occupied France itself. 68
" Eden saw opportunity in this difference of
opinion to sideline, at least temporarily, de Gaulle.He proposed a compromise
that de Gaulle "should put his house in order and form a more broadly based
committee, bringing in at least a few more of independent mind who do not obey
blindly .... "69
Support of de Gaulle contradicted the Americans' Wilsonian principles of
self-determination. The French population had not chosen him to lead the fight
against the Axis. For many, de Gaulle was a British lackey with little support
inside or outside of France.70 Personal animosity developed between Roosevelt
and de Gaulle. The president found de Gaulle arrogant, bad-tempered, overHalifax to Foreign Office, 8 May 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965.See also
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sensitive, and uncooperative.Those traits convinced Roosevelt that the people of
France would never elect de Gaulle as their leader.Officials around Roosevelt
also had little respect for de Gaulle and found him anti-American.71 British
frustration with de Gaulle, in spite of its alleged support, made growing American
influence easier to accept and harder to refute.Halifax stated that the Americans
were not alone in describing de Gaulle as a difficult person.72 Just as Eden wanted
to pursue all avenues of relations with the French factions, Halifax stated an
advantage to American relations with Petain."In this manner, whatever way things
might develop each ...could benefit by the relations with the other."73
Even before the United States entered the war in December 1941, the
British relied on the Americans more than the Free French, and the Resistance
suffered from material and moral neglect.Churchill told de Gaulle that the British
could not afford any major conflicts with the Americans. In August 1941,
Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter, and the Americans might
for example, Memorandum of Conversation by Undersecretary of
State (Welles), 28 Sept. 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol.2, 540; President of the French
National Committee at London (de Gaulle) to President Roosevelt, n.d.Oct.
1942, FRUS, 1942, vol.2, 541-44; Memorandum by Acting Chief of the Division of
European Affairs (Atherton) to the Undersecretary of State (Welles), 26 Oct.
1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 544; Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of
State (Hull), 21 Dec.1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 553.
71See,

72Halifax
73

note, 18 June 1942, PRO, FO 371, 115/31965.

Halifax to the Foreign Office, 27 Dec.1941, PRO, FO 371, 56/28326.See
also Consul General Haggard to Foreign Office, 16 Dec.1941, PRO, FO 371,
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construe recognition of de Gaulle as a violation of its terms. Article Three
respected "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which
they will live... ."74 In January 1942, when the Allies redrafted the Charter as the
Declaration of United Nations, Roosevelt refused to include de Gaulle's Fighting
French.75
De Gaulle ignored the Charter's application to French territory,
particularly Saint Pierre and Miquelon, two French islands ten miles off the New
Foundland coast. In September 1940, many islanders expressed their interest in
Gaullism and formed the Ugion du General de Gaulle, despite the Vichy
Governor de Boumat's attempts to suppress the movement. Knowing that the
Canadians and the Americans intended to take the islands, de Gaulle ordered
Admiral Muselier and four Fighting French vessels to seize control of Saint Pierre
and Miquelon on Christmas 1941. Roosevelt demanded that de Gaulle tum the
islands over to Canada because Free French possession endangered relations with
Petain. De Gaulle's actions frustrated bad American-Free French relations and
increased Anglo-American tensions.76 Secretary of State Cordell Hull accused
7
4Sir
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GPO, 1959), 540-70; Concern of the United States Over the Seizure of Saint

65
Great Britain of initiating the entire affair since Churchill had given de Gaulle his
moral and financial blessing. The prime minister, however, disapproved of de
Gaulle proceeding without notifying the Americans and found the subsequent
conflict embarrassing for the British and threatening for the Free French. 77
A British military expedition in May 1942 stifled de Gaulle's plans to
reassert his military authority. De Gaulle had planned with the British a joint
Anglo-Free French takeover of the French colony Madagascar because of a feared
Japanese capture of the Indian Ocean island. The British, however, decided to
capture unilaterally Madagascar on 6 May, which angered de Gaulle. The
expedition may have damaged Anglo-Free French relations and dismissed Free
French claims to sovereignty, 78 but Free French exclusion limited provocation of
Vichy. The importance of Petain's reactions had increased with the Anglo-

Pierre and Miquelon Islands by Free French Forces, 1 Jan. to 26 March 1942,
FRUS, 1942, vol. 2, 655-71.
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American invasion of North Africa, Operation Torch, which was scheduled to
begin in six months.79
Another major conflict between the British and the French Resistance
arose over intelligence operations. Prior to the fall of France, British Military
Intelligence cooperated with the French Deuxieme Bureau. In July 1940, with this
link broken, the British created the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to work
independently and with resisters on specific military missions. According to SOE
operative F. W. Deakin, the SOE recruited "individual agents for precise tasks of
intelligence and sabotage, and to avoid as far as possible the centralizing
tendencies both of the Resistance groups now appearing inside France and the
Free French headquarters in London."80 Sir Colin Gubbins, head of the SOE
during the Second World War, said the SOE combined elements of various
government departments for the purpose of attacking the enemy with unorthodox
methods.
Here was the problem and the plan, then: to
encourage and enable the peoples of the occupied
countries to harass the German war effort at every
possible point by sabotage, subversion, go-slow
practices, coup de main raids, etc., and at the same
time to build up secret forces therein, organized,
7
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armed, and trained to take their part only when the
final assault began. These two objects are, in fact,
fundamentally incompatible: to divert attention from
the creation of secret armies meant avoiding any
activity which would attract German attention; to act
offensively entailed attracting the special attention and
efforts of the Gestapo and S.S. and the redoubling of
vigilance on their part. Not an easy problem, but
somehow the two had to be done.81
Aware of incompatible goals, SOE leaders faced problems in the field
similar to the Metropolitan Resistance. The overlapping of sections, hostility
between British and French intelligence units,82 and animosity between British
military and intelligence agents hindered operations. Maurice Buckmaster, a
British intelligence agent, described many of the problems. "Subversive warfare
was a new and untried weapon: there was no code for the underground warrior,
except to think and act faster than the German security police or the French
Milice. 1111.1 Because this secret warfare was new on such a large scale in the Second
World War, an initial reluctance emerged among the military and experienced
spies to accept these agents. Many disliked the independence these new spies
developed and believed their unwarranted arrogance caused needless errors in
judgment. Buckmaster continued, "the value of our activities was not easily
81
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intelligible....It was difficult to get the military authorities to take us seriously.
What proved to be a new arm of the service seemed, in their eyes, to be an
elaborate and dangerous charade."84 Agents could not disclose the specifics of a
mission or its place in the general war plan, even if they knew, and had difficulty
receiving material resources from the military.85
Hostilities between British and Free French intelligence overshadowed
intra-British conflicts.The strained Churchill-de Gaulle relationship precluded
most opportunities for successful collaboration between the SOE and the Bureau
Central de Renseignements et d'Action, the civil executive committee of the
Conseil National de la Resistance.De Gaulle h
" ad to be rude to the British to
prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet.He certainly carried out
this policy with perseverance."86 SOE had been ordered not to work too closely
with de Gaulle because he lacked solid support in Britain and Metropolitan
France.De Gaulle made this order easier to carry out.According to historian
Michael Bird , "The SOE resented the fact that Churchill had agreed to the Free
French setting up an independent intelligence service, while de Gaulle and his
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officers, blinded by an almost oveiwhelming inferiority complex, were bitterly
opposed to any British agents working in France."87
SOE resisted giving de Gaulle any real authority to back up his role as a
symbol of Fighting France.88 De Gaulle wanted control of the two SOE sections
operating in France.The F section encompassed both French and non-French
recruits who received directives from the British Chiefs of Staff and would assist
in demolitions during the Normandy invasion.Historian Jorgen Haestrup found
that many of the French recruits were those ''who volunteered for work in the
section often because ... [they] did not feel at home in the de Gaulle circles ...
"

89
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between the two sections' work was the price which
had to be paid.90
The F and RF sections created several independent circuits in France and
armed thousands of resisters. SOE circuits and Resistance networks argued over
who received the limited amount of available supplies. Delivering supplies to the
Resistance had proven problematic. Infiltration through neutral countries
permitted only small shipments. Sea delivery imposed a heavy risk just to reach a
coastline, let alone the inland regions of France. Airplanes were unable to fly over
enemy territory with minimal risk, especially early in the war. Difficult mountain
airdrops exposed the maquis and their arsenals. After his first trip as de Gaulle's
special envoy, Jean Moulin submitted a report to the British in October 1941
describing the needs of the Resistance, which included moral support,
establishment of intra-Resistance communications, money, and armaments. He
requested three million francs a month for three networks, to be doubled at year's
end. The money would be used to increase propaganda but not violence against
the Etat Fran�ais.91 Although the Allies did not wish to incite a rebellion yet, the
intensified propaganda conflicted with their emphasis on military aims.
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With little Anglo-French Resistance cooperation, British intelligence and
sabotage units received the bulk of available resources. This irritated the
Resistance networks92 and fostered the perception that the Resistance lacked the
necessary commitment to fight the Germans. 93 SOE believed the Resistance asked
British agents to relay a high proportion of inappropriate political messages. 94
Complications would multiply when the SOE combined in September 1943 with
its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), into the SOE/SO
under predominantly American control. The failure to establish good British
French Resistance relations meant that Resistance networks would receive less
moral and material support in future operations.
British policy toward de· Gaulle developed quickly and incompletely in June
1940. De Gaulle's symbolism was important, even during the times of strained
relations with the British. Churchill expected the Cabinet to avoid the appearance
of anything but blissful British relations with de Gaulle and solidarity within the
Free French movement, regardless of reality. The prime minister often
"emphasized the extreme importance of not allowing any public mention in the
press of differences in the Free French movement. The movement was of the
See Mack note, 15 Nov. 1943, PRO, FO 371, 36059B; Ibid., 25 Nov. 1943,
PRO, FO 371, 36059B.
92
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utmost importance, but its influence might suffer seriously if it were split."95
Churchill's motivation laid not in promoting de Gaulle as the legitimate head of a
French government but rather in counteracting the image of Petain as the only
savior of France. If other viable leaders emerged at anytime before Moulin's
efforts to unify the French Resistance around de Gaulle, few in the British
government would have hesitated to cast de Gaulle aside.96 Even Churchill might
have done so without much remorse given the number of times de Gaulle had
tested his patience.97
This ambivalent and fragile support for the Free French coincided with a
dual policy of developing de Gaulle's movement and keeping other options open,
including one with Vichy. Even by February 1942, long after formal diplomatic
relations ceased between Britain and Vichy, Eden advocated casting a wide net
with regard to France. "Petain, of course, is quite wrong in thinking that we
regard de Gaulle as our only French friend. Our policy is-and I have made this
clear to many Frenchmen during the last year-to collaborate with any Frenchman
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who is prepared to collaborate with us in resistance to our enemies."98 Rooker, the
British representative to the Fighting French, reported a conversation where de
Gaulle said to Dejean:

'"le joue tout contre tout et je gagne chaque foif.' During the

past two years, bluff has stood de Gaulle in good stead. It is important to make it
clear that cooperation, and not bluff, is the only policy likely to benefit him."99
The dynamic nature of the French Resistance exasperated efforts to control
symbolism and pursue all options and led to clashes and jealousies with Britain
over SOE activities. British frustration with de Gaulle mounted over failed and
forbidden military missions, including Dakar in September 1940, when many
thought it would be his undoing, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon in December
1941, when many hoped it would be his undoing. The British Foreign Office
frequently wondered if de Gaulle would do less damage and be more controllable
if he stayed in London or went to North Africa. Cadogan believed de Gaulle
would be more effective in the Allied war effort if he remained on French soil but
more controllable if he stayed in London. W. H. B. Mack thought de Gaulle
would be more successful and controllable if stayed in London, but the Foreign
Office would have trouble dissociating from him should the need arise. 100
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The British government often fell short of its own expectations. The
government pursued a foolhardy policy of building up an image of de Gaulle
without taking into account the general's personality. Churchill found the
Resistance valuable for future use but did not provide proper support. Sir Samuel
Hoare, British Ambassador in Madrid, summarized the British policy.
I have for some weeks been chewing the cud of
ignorance about France, and my belief is gradually
hardening that neither H.M.G. nor their experts have
any solid background against which they could
effectively defend, before a debating society of judges
from Mars, their day-by-day actions and reactions to
French developments.tot
By the time the Americans joined the war effort, strained British-French
Resistance relations could not turn around with rising American influence over
military and strategic operations.
By November 1942 and the invasion of North Africa, the desperate and
vacuous gesture by the British of recognizing de Gaulle as a leader of those
French citizens who rallied to him in June 1940 had failed. On 3 November 1942,
Churchill told Eden, "I propose to break Torch to [de Gaulle] on the night before
myself personally. I want no 'olive branch,' but a soldierly compliment about his
men.11102 This remark illustrated the problem of knowingly creating a symbol out of
to Sir Orme Sargent, Foreign Office, Political Intelligence
Department, 4 March 1942, PRO, FO 371, 880/32040.
101 Hoare
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an unknown individual, without fully thinking through the consequences, and then
trying to maximize the symbol's potential and minimize its independence. British
relations with de Gaulle and the French Resistance movement as a whole during
the remainder of the war would not develop diplomatically and militarily. The
British misunderstood de Gaulle, and the general abused and snubbed the support
of his early benefactor.

CONCLUSION

In 1941, an official in the British Foreign Office accurately described his
government's relationship with de Gaulle. "In fairness to de Gaulle, it should be
remembered that, as incomprehensible Frenchmen are to us, we are still more
incomprehensible to Frenchmen."1 This mutual perception set the tone for British
French Resistance relations throughout the Second World War. The Resistance
neither emerged as a unified and efficient movement nor earned substantive
British respect and support.
The inability of the Resistance to unify and centralize power resulted from
several factors. After years of unstable French governments and military
occupation, an exhausted French population looked to several leaders. De Gaulle
and Petain both believed France had to be saved to rise again but disagreed on
the course of her salvation. They exemplified the vacillating French population.
The armistice left its opponents dangling. Wartime conditions imposed an
enormous strain on those citizens opposed to resistance and saw resisters as
creating more problems for France. Resisters were homeless and had no stable
past to promote and reassert. Instead, resisters advanced their own personal
philosophies. A wide array of politically oriented networks and individuals led
small loyal followings. Only 10 percent of the population participated in the
1
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Resistance through most of the war, but the movement was larger than anything
in prior French experience. Politics overshadowed early objectives of ridding
France of the Germans and consistently set back unification at each stage.
De Gaulle emerged as a symbolic and nominal leader of the Resistance
because he had access, though tenuous, to the British. Still, de Gaulle's egotistical,
authoritative, and opinionated personality caused tensions within the Metropolitan
Resistance and with the British. The general lacked the legal legitimacy of other
exiled governments in London. He had no basis on which to stake a claim for the
political leadership of France, and the British avoided endowing him with such
legality and responsibility. Many British officials refused to accept de Gaulle as
the best intermediary with the Metropolitan Resistance and leader of French
interests. They resorted to political games to thwart de Gaulle. The British were
reluctant, understandably, to arm civilians without military experience. SOE units
within France antagonized resisters because agents performed tasks the Resistance
felt better qualified for and took away recruits and armaments. Without
armaments, resisters could not act or prepare to act militarily. However just the
British policy, it left politics as the resisters' primary outlet for dissent.
Unification of the Resistance did not begin until January 1943 when
Moulin arranged for Combat, Liberation, and Franc-Tireur to combine into the
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"Mouvements Unis de la Resistance".2 Continued ideological differences and a
deep distrust for one another ensured a fragile alliance. Combat's Frenay held
talks with a member of the Vichy government in hopes of recruiting some of his
old comrades. Liberation's d'Astier was suspicious of Frenay's militaty past and
present dedication and temporarily broke off negotiations. Moulin's troubles also
encompassed de Gaulle. The general tried to exert centralized control from
London over the Metropolitan Resistance. He believed this would end continental
rivalries and advance his program of attentisme. Interior forces strongly opposed
outsiders dictating actions within France.
In March 1943, Moulin added a national structure to the Mouvements Unis
de la Resistance with the creation of the "Conseil National de la Resistance". It
incorporated politicians, anti-politicians, trade unionists, churchmen, soldiers, and
four of the major northern networks, which where the "Organisation Civile et
Militaire", "Ceux de la Resistance", "Ceux de la Liberation", and "LiberationNord". The primarily Gaullist Zone Occupee made incorporation of the northern
networks into the Conseil simpler. The fifth major network the Communist "Front
National" did not join this attempt at national unification.3 The Conseil tried to
deemphasize ideology and supported de Gaulle as the symbolic leader of the
2
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Resistance. Conflicts concerned the level of paramilitary operations, but the lack
of armaments avoided a confrontation within the Conseil. 4
In May 1943, the Conseil National de la Resistance completed its
constitution.A few weeks later, however, the organization suffered irreparable
damage, despite being under the nominal leadership of de Gaulle.The Gestapo
arrested General Delestraint, Moulin, and the other Conseil delegates. Moulin
died in a Lyon prison of wounds sustained from torture.Although he died without
revealing Resistance secrets, Moulin failed to arrange for his successors and left
the Conseil, in effect, leaderless. Questions about Moulin's motivations for secrecy
have revolved around the need for security, his desire for power and control, and
his possible role as a Soviet agent.Without a charismatic leader to fill the void,
the Gaullist delegation left the Conseil. Georges Bidault, Frenay's second in
command in Combat, finally took over the leadership.5
The Conseil National de la Resistance held only one more meeting before
liberation in December 1943 in Paris. The Conseil agreed that its members would
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consist of Liberation, Franc-Tireur, Combat, Radical-Socialist, Parti Democratique
Populaire, Organisation Civile et Militaire, Federation Republicaine Nationale,
Confederation Generale du Travail, Confederation Fran�aise de Travailleurs
Chretiens, Communists, Socialists, Alliance Democratique, Ceux de la Resistance,
Ceux de la Liberation, Liberation-Nord, and this time, Front National. 6 Prior to
liberation, other attempts at unification occurred but never equaled the one-time
accomplishment of continental and Gaullist delegations under Moulin. The
Conseil unified diverse networks on paper but not in character and effectiveness.
Moulin may have accumµlated too much power for himself. He held the three
important positions of president of the Conseil National de la Resistance, member
of the Conseil National Fran�ais, which was the directing organ of la France
Combattante in London, and General de Gaulle's personal envoy in France.
Moulin, however, was the only trusted link between de Gaulle and the
Metropolitan Resistance, and his actions may have been necessary.
The attempt at unification came too late to improve the status of the
Resistance with the British. In November 1942, the Allies invaded French North
Africa in Operation Torch. When the subsequent Italian campaign stalled outside
of Rome, Churchill increased supplies to the Resistance, especially the southern
maquis. The Allies were in the process of deciding on an invasion of Normandy,

Overlord, or southern France, Anvil, or both. Anvil meant Churchill could
6
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concentrate on Italy and possibly gain more of Europe. Despite his troubles with
de Gaulle, which included stymying the general's words and actions,7 the prime
minister promoted the Resistance in discussions with Roosevelt. He tried to prove
to the Americans that resisters could play a major role in Anvil, which would take
away fewer troops from Italy. Churchill's arming of the maquis gave resisters a
false hope because he used the tactic as a tool in the Anglo-American dispute
over the second front. Churchill told de Gaulle that Britain would not side with
the Resistance against the Americans. When the Allies decided to launch Overlord
in early June 1944 and follow up with Anvil, later called Dragoon, in August,
Churchill drastically reduced shipments to the Resistance. The British did not
explore the continuation of material support.8
A few in the British government supported utilizing the Resistance.
Rooker, the British representative to the Comite Fran�ais, believed British,
American, and French representatives needed to coordinate better supply
distribution. "Failure to arm and to use the forces prepared in accordance with the
wishes of Allied propaganda to fight in the enemy's rear at the moment of landing
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would have grave military, political, and psychological consequences."9 Another
British official said, "There is unfortunately only too much justice in the French
claim that full use is not being made, and at the present rate could hardly be
made before D-Day, of the potential support of Resistance groups at the time of
an Allied landing. "10
Still, the British feared arming a particular group of resisters or civilians.
Despite growing unity, if one network possessed a lot of weaponry, it would no
doubt concentrate on increasing its own political position. At a meeting between
Churchill and d'Astier in January 1944, the latter reassured the prime minister
that the various Resistance groups would put politics aside until the enemy left.
He pleaded for arms for the desperate maquis. Churchill expressed reseivations
about Free French security, press leaks, and the Resistance's sincerity in
unequivocally accepting Eisenhower's instructions on D-Day.11
Proposed D-Day tasks for resisters included interfering with German troop
movements on railroads and roads, disrupting the German Air Force, attacking
local enemy headquarters, harrassing the enemy generally, preserving or
9
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demolishing certain communication sites, fomenting civilian uprisings, and
encouraging strikes and passive resistance.12 Not depending on execution of those
plans, the Allies designed similar plans for the combined SOE/SO. The British
also agreed that any political administration would submit to the authority of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff through a Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which
countered Resistance plans for self-government.13 During the invasion, the
inadequately armed Resistance managed to hinder the Wehrmacht's retreat. A
better armed Resistance might have eased the slow Allied breakout from some of
the Normandy beachheads.
The Second World War provided the British with a new opportunity to use
resistance movements as part of military and political strategy. New methods
proved difficult to implement without mistakes and faced prejudice among
traditional military soldiers. Although the French Resistance received more
attention than other resistance movements in western Europe during the first half
of the war, British priorities still ebbed and flowed as other theaters of war heated
up, including the Pacific in late 1940 and 1941 and the Balkans in 1941. De
Gaulle was irascible, tenacious, and perhaps vindictive. John Colville believed the
Churchill-de Gaulle relationship affected Europe and the United States for
of Strength, 26 Jan. 1944. See also Foreign Office note, 18
April 1944, PRO, FO 371, 82/41905.
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decades. Colville thought the war in Indochina was de Gaulle's partial revenge on
Roosevelt. 14 The French Resistance did not play a larger and more dependable
role in the Second World War because it lacked cohesion and focus. The British
overestimated its ability to control a diffuse movement and a renegade general.
Early problems in their relationship precluded future strategic cooperation.

14Colville,

Inner Circle, 247.
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